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From International Fire Fighter Magazine, January 1959
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How Fire Was Fought
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By Neal Callahan
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Chicago Fire Department
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On Monday, December 1, 1958, at 2:42 p. m., a telephone operator on duty in the main Fire Alarm Office of the Chicago Fire Department received a call from a hysterical woman who screamed into the phone about a fire at 3808 West Iowa Street. The woman was so excited that it was difficult for the operator to make out what she was saying. However, she was able to get the location and the word “fire” understandable and on that basis a still alarm fire was given to Engine 85, Hook and Ladder 36, Squad 6, Patrol 7 and the Chief of the 18th Battalion.
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Shortly after, calls began pouring into the fire alarm office about the fire and after the third call, the office struck box 5182. The third call was believed to have come from a nun, because she reported a fire in her building and that children were trapped on the second floor.
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As box 5182 was being struck at 2:44 p. m., Engine 85 reported on the scene and requested a box alarm, which they already had. The engine, using the fire department radio communications, also requested that all available ambulances be sent to the scene. Eighty-five reported that children had jumped from second floor windows and a great number of them had been injured. Immediately, the office dispatched 10 fire department ambulances and notified the police to send all available squadrons to the scene. They responded by ordering over 70 stretcher-bearing squadrons to the fire.
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Engine 85's quick thinking and fast action resulted in the saving of many lives. They had arrived on the scene within two minutes of the first alarm and, seeing the situation, the officer of the company quickly ordered his men into two teams; one to do rescue-work by putting up the ladders carried on the engine and the others to lead out a 2 1/2-inch line and direct it on the seat of the fire which was located in the stairwell on the northeast corner of the U-constructed building. It was 85's intention to try and cut the volume of fire.
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Hook and Ladder 36 and Squad 6 arrived minutes after 85 and the truckmen quickly raised every ladder they carried and the squad personnel began catching children in the life nets. As soon as the ladders were raised, the truckmen went to the roof to open it in hopes of drawing the fire out the roof.
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All this had taken about three minutes. Children were climbing down ladders. Others were jumping out the windows into life nets and still others were jumping on to the sidewalk below.
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Chief Miles Devine of the 18th Battalion arrived at the fire scene about 2:46, made a quick survey of the situation and ordered a 2-11 alarm struck.
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The box alarm companies were arriving on the scene now and ladders had been placed at every window on the second floor of the building where children were trapped.
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The first box alarm engine to arrive at the school pulled off two 2 1/2-inch lines equipped with fog nozzles and took the lines up the front stairwell in hopes of pushing the fire back down the 107-foot corridor into the stairwell and out the open roof. This would permit the trapped children to escape behind the protective fog of water. Engine 85 had their 2 l/2-inch line directed into the rear stairwell.
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Meanwhile, the firemen performing the rescue work on the outside of the building realized that individual handling of each child was impossible. The fire was spreading too fast and the heat and gases were beginning to get into the classrooms so the firemen on the tops of the ladders began to drop the children into life nets below and some onto the sidewalks below. It was better, they figured, to have the child break a leg or an arm than to die in the building. These fireman did this under the orders of Chief Devine.
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As the firemen climbed the front stairs with the two 2 1/2-inch lines, truckmen were on the roof, swinging axes as fast as they could to get the roof open. The fire had then reached a point where the northeast corner of the roof had gotten so weak from the fire that it collapsed, causing the ceiling of the corridor also to collapse. This sent a rush of super-heated air and gases, along with heavy smoke, into the rooms where the children were still trapped and this is what killed many of them. The firemen had just reached the top of the stairs in the front of the building when this happened and they were blown down the stairs to the first floor.
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When this happened, Chief Devine ordered a 5-11 alarm, skipping the usual procedure of pulling a 3-11 and a 4-11. The 5-11 alarm was struck at 2:57 p. m. Fire Commissioner Robert J. Quinn and other top fire department officials had left their offices in City Hall shortly before the 2-11 alarm had been sounded. Commissioner Quinn arrived on the scene shortly after the 5-11 had been struck and immediately went into the burning building up the front stairwell. At this time, the still, box and 2-11 alarm companies were pouring water into the building and the department's snorkel was pouring a heavy stream into the classrooms, keeping the fire and heat back. Commissioner Quinn led two companies up the front stairs in hopes of pushing the fire back, but they were forced back by the heat and smoke. The Commissioner later said he had never seen smoke pouring from a building so dense, thick and under such pressure in his 30 years as a fireman.
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It was only a matter of minutes that the firemen were kept out of the classrooms. Soon after the snorkel had gone to work, the fire was pushed back into the stairwell and out the roof and firemen reached the rooms where the children were. They were dead. The heat and gases forced into the room but the falling of the roof and ceiling had been enough to cause their deaths.
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The fire had begun in the stairwell and had traveled up to the second floor very quickly. A closed fire door had prevented it from getting into the first floor. But when it reached the top of the stairwell, it traveled down a three-foot cock-loft over the corridor and Fire Commissioner believes that the fire had gotten a terrific hold in this cockloft before it was discovered.
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When the alarm of fire was received by the fire department, the fire had already burned most of the cock-loft away and it was only five minutes or so later that the roof and ceiling came in on the children.
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Testimony at the inquest revealed that a delayed alarm occurred in notifying the fire department. Fire Commissioner Quinn feels that this is the real blame for the deaths of the children.
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At 4:17 p.m., less than two hours after the first alarm of fire, the 5-11 alarm at box 5182 was struck out by orders of Fire Commissioner Quinn.
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Story © 1959 International Association of Fire Fighters
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